Introduction
The growth in de®ned contribution (DC) corporate pension plans, 1 in which unsophisticated individuals are required to make the asset allocation decisions that will have a large effect on their retirement wealth, as well as recent proposals to privatize social security, 2 have given rise to concerns that individual plan participants will suffer large welfare costs as the result of their suboptimal decisions. Such concerns are reinforced both by recent claims of systematic biases in individual decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Riepe, 1998; Olsen, 1998) , and by evidence of widespread ®nancial ignorance. For example, a survey of the ®nancial knowledge of Americans by Merrill Lynch Inc. has prompted Bernheim (1996) to claim that`This evidence depicts a crisis in ®nancial planning F F F most Americans are not making prudent ®nancial decisions' and another authority to opine that Examining (the investment strategy of) their (de®ned contribution) plan is beyond the expertise of most Americans.'
3 Concern with the level of investment expertise of the individual investor has led to calls for additional ®nancial education, 4 and even a national pension education programme. According to Berg (1995) 5 the US Department of Labor has launched a`national pension education program aimed at drawing the attention of American workers to the importance of taking personal responsibility for their retirement security'.
DC pension plans, whether they are administered by employers or employer-chosen administrators as is typical in the USA, or by other intermediaries as in the privatized Chilean social security system, presuppose that individuals are able to choose security portfolios that are at least approximately ef®cient for them. It is therefore important to consider the extent to which lack of sophistication is likely to lead individual investors to incur signi®cant welfare losses by choosing inef®cient portfolios, and to quantify the likely magnitude of these losses. To the extent that markets are informationally ef®cient,`one stock is as good as another ', 6 and unsophisticated investors are protected against the risk of buying overpriced securities (or missing the opportunity to buy underpriced ones). However, even in an ef®cient market, investors may depart signi®cantly from an optimal asset allocation strategy, and may invest in too few stocks to achieve ef®cient diversi®cation. 7 In this article, we take a small step towards evaluating the likely magnitude of the welfare costs of inappropriate asset allocation and inadequate diversi®cation. Our basic framework is that of an investor who is concerned with maximizing the expected value of a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function de®ned over wealth at the end of the investment horizon. In the interests of simplicity, we eschew more elaborate utility speci®cations such as recursive utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989) , and other speci®cations which impose a myopic concern with intermediate rates of return. 8 We adopt a utility of ®nal wealth 3 J. Carter Beese, Commissioner of the Securites and Exchange Commission, De®ned Contribution Plan Investing, April 13, 1993. 4 One might question the value of much of this ®nancial education to the extent that it increases investors' equity allocations by propagating the canard that stocks in the USA have outperformed bonds for every 30-year holding period since 1871 (Siegel, 1998) . Such mechanistic extrapolations of history ignore the fact that the future returns on stocks must depend on their current level; they also ignore the recent history of Japan for example, where the Nikkei index languishes around 14,000, some 66 per cent below its high of around 42,000 reached in 1989.
5 Cited in Bernheim (1996) . 6 The dartboard competition run by the Wall Street Journal, in which the stock selections of investment analysts are compared with a random selection, suggests that even investment professionals have great dif®culty in outperforming a random selection.
7 Dybvig (1988) describes how inef®cient dynamic strategies may impose costs on investors in an ef®cient market.
8 Benartzi and Thaler (1998) suggest that investors may be concerned with the distribution of the short-term returns on their investments, rather than the distribution of wealth at the horizon as assumed here. assumption because it enables us to avoid dif®cult issues associated with labour income, and because our primary concern is with retirement planning, and we think that, as a ®rst approximation, it is reasonable to separate the retirement portfolio management issue from more general issues concerned with savings behaviour.
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Within this framework of expected utility of ®nal wealth maximization, we consider two aspects of the portfolio decision: how much to allocate between stocks and cash, 10 and how many stocks to include in the portfolio. Extensions to more complete settings ± including stochastic interest rates, time varying risk premia, and more elaborate utility speci®cations ± represent challenging and interesting extensions of our approach.
Three previous papers have considered related issues. First, Ackerlof and Yellen (1985) show that small deviations from optimal (`rational') decisions that have small welfare consequences for individuals may have major consequences for equilibrium; since our concern is not with the the equilibrium pricing of securities, this paper is not directly relevant. Second, Cochrane (1989) shows in the context of lifetime consumption allocation under certainty that ®rst-order deviations from the optimal consumption plan have only second-order consequences for utility. Most recently, Canner et al. (1997) , in a paper that is most closely related to this, contrast the portfolios recommended for investors by ®nancial advisors with what their interpretation of ®nancial theory implies is optimal, and show that, although the composition of the recommended portfolios is far from`optimal', these portfolios plot close to the ef®cient frontier in mean±variance space.
In Section 1, we review some of the evidence on the biases and imperfections of individual investment decision making. In Section 2, we present a simple analytical framework for assessing the welfare costs of suboptimal asset allocation, and use this to calibrate the likely magnitude of welfare losses for reasonable parameter values. We con®rm our analytical results, which rely on distributional assumptions, by Monte Carlo simulation on US stock market returns drawn from the CRSP tape for the period 1926 to 1997. Our general conclusion is that the costs of excessive conservatism in asset allocation are likely to be modest, at least as measured relative to typical levels of fees levied for portfolio management services, despite the fact that asset allocation is`the major determinant of investment performance ' (Brinson et al., 1995) . In Section 3 we turn our attention to diversi®cation within the stock market and use Monte Carlo simulation on individual stock data to assess the welfare costs 9 Cochrane (1989) argues that the welfare costs of suboptimal savings-consumption decisions are likely to be modest. 10 We assume a constant interest rate which makes long-term bonds a redundant asset class. For models of optimal portfolio allocation between bonds, stocks and cash when interest rates are stochastic, see , Brennan and Xia (1998 ), Campbell and Viceira (1998 ), and Cantirelli (1998 . of imperfect diversi®cation. 11 We ®nd that, because of the higher returns realized by small ®rms, an equally weighted (EW) portfolio of as few as ®ve stocks with monthly rebalancing can provide the same level of expected utility for a relatively risk-tolerant investor as an investment in the value weighted (VW) market index. However, when a more realistic buy and hold strategy is considered, it takes as many as 50 stocks to match the performance of the VW market index for the more risk-averse investor. Thus, there are signi®ant gains from portfolio diversi®cation. Section 4 concludes. Bernheim (1996) writes:`The increasing popularity of 401(k)'s 12 leaves critical decisions concerning participation, contributions, and investments in the hands of employees. Many employees choose to contribute little, or nothing at all, while others invest heavily in safe, low return, ®xed-income funds. ' O'Neill (1990 ' O'Neill ( , 1993 provides evidence that investors both have insuf®cient diversi®cation and exhibit`excessive conservatism' in selecting investments. This is con®rmed by the ®nding that the most popular investment in DC plans is the employer's own equity which accounts for around 30 per cent of investment portfolios, despite the fact that its return has signi®cant diversi®-able risk which is likely to be highly correlated with the return on the employee's human capital;
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13 the second most popular investment is the guaranteed investment certi®cate (around 23 per cent) which is an insurance company liability with a ®xed annual return (Brennan, 1997) . Benartzi and Thaler (1998) report evidence that many participants in DC plans allocate their contributions according to the`1 n ' rule; that is, they allocate their funds equally across all the bond and stock funds that are included in the plan, thus making their initial asset allocation the passive result of the mix of funds selected for inclusion by the plan managers. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) report what they term a`status quo bias' in investment decision making: they ®nd that participants in the TIAA/CREF pension plan tend not to alter the ratio of their 11 There is an older literature studying how many securities are required to achieve an adequate level of diversi®cation; see Evans and Archer (1968) for example. However, these authors did not attempt to assess the economic costs of imperfect diversi®cation as we do.
12 These are employer adminstered, tax-advantaged, retirement accounts; 96 per cent of company plans allow participants to choose between different funds but not to invest in individual stock (with the exception of the employer's own stock) (Greenwich Associates, 1998).
13 Benartzi and Thaler (1998) report the results of a survey by John Hancock Financial Services which found that a majority of respondents thought that money market funds (which invest only in high-grade short-term paper and under normal conditions maintain their net asset value at par) were riskier than government bonds, and felt that their own company stock was safer than a diversi®ed portfolio. contributions 14 to the ®xed income and equity funds in response to the returns earned on these two asset classes ± as a result, over time their asset allocations become heavily in¯uenced by the history of realized returns on the different asset classes. Friend and Blume (1975) report that individuals who do own stocks typically own only one or two different stocks, while Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) found that only 47.7 per cent of consumers holding more than $100 000 in liquid assets in 1984 held any stock at all directly. 15 Collectively, this evidence is consistent with the notion that individual investors are too conservative in their asset allocation, allow their allocation to be determined passively by the number and types of funds offered by the plan sponsor and by the returns experienced on the different asset classes in their portfolio and, in situations where they have discretion, tend to diversify too little.
In other research, Elton et al. (1989) have shown that commodity funds are sold on the basis of their exceptional return performance prior to issuance, but that they fail to deliver similar results after they become public, for the good reason that their performance is random, and only those that have performed exceptionally well are brought to the market creating an ex-post selection bias in the pre-issue performance. Similarly, Weiss (1989) , Peavey (1990), and Wang et al. (1992) have found that new issues of closed-end funds and REITS are overpriced, unlike other initial public offerings; and that, compared with other initial public offerings, they offer higher underwriting selling fees and have substantially greater individual investor participation. Finally, we observe that investors purchase mutual funds with load fees when they could purchase no-load funds. These suboptimal behaviours are undoubtedly costly for the investors who pursue them.
On the other hand, other examples of`irrational' behaviour may simply represent what Merton Miller (1977) refers to as`neutral mutations' in an informationally ef®cient market. For example, Sirri and Tufano (1993) and Patel et al. (1991) report that investor purchases of mutual funds are unduly in¯uenced by recent good performance even though that shows no persistence. Patel et al. (1991) and Warther (1994) ®nd that the fraction of their funds¯ow that individuals direct to the purchase of mutual funds is an increasing function of recent past returns on the market ± they refer to this behaviour as`barndoor closing'.
16 Odean (1998) ®nds evidence that individual investors have a strong tendency to sell pro®table investments and to hold on to losers. While this would be a`neutral mutation' (except for tax consequences) in an informationally ef®cient market, Odean argues that the winners that are sold on average outperform the market by 2.4 per cent over the next year, while the losers that are kept underperform the market by 1 per cent. Thus, if one accepts Odean's evidence of market inef®ciency, selling a winner instead of a losing stock costs the investor a total of 3.4 per cent. In summary, there is extensive evidence that investors behave in a suboptimal fashion in a variety of ways. Therefore, it is important to assess the welfare costs of suboptimal investment strategies. In the next section, we consider the costs of suboptimal leverage.
The Welfare Cost of Suboptimal Leverage

A Simple Analytical Model
To analyse the welfare costs of following a non-optimal asset allocation policy, consider an investor who is concerned with maximizing the expected value of an iso-elastic utility function de®ned over his wealth at the end of T periods, W T :
where ã , 1. The investor's coef®cient of relative risk aversion (RRA) is given by 1 À ã.
The investor may invest in a riskless asset whose instantaneous rate of return is a constant, r, or in a risky asset. The price of the risky asset, S, follows the stochastic differential equation
where ì and ó are constants, and dz is the increment to a Gauss Wiener process.
If x is the fraction of wealth allocated to the risky asset, the investor's wealth evolves according to
Under this portfolio strategy, wealth at the end of T periods is lognormally distributed
Then, since ln U (W ) Àln ã ã ln W , the investor's expected utility under the portfolio allocation x, given initial wealth W 0 , EU (W 0 , x), may be written as
Differentiating with respect to x, the investor's optimal allocation to the risky asset, x Ã , is
is the Sharpe ratio for the risky asset and RRA (1 À ã) is the investor's coef®cient of relative risk aversion. De®ne W 0 (EU , x) as the level of initial wealth required to achieve a given level of expected utility, EU , under the (possibly non-optimal) investment policy, x. Then the quantity
is the initial wealth required to achieve, under policy x, the same level of expected utility as is achieved under the optimal policy, x Ã , starting with initial wealth W 0 . Since x Ã is, by de®nition, optimal, it follows that
as the ratio of the wealth required under policy x, to the wealth required under policy x Ã , to achieve a given level of expected utility. Then from equation (4) we have
where x Ã is given by equation (5). It follows that r(x) is a measure of the inef®ciency of strategy x. For example, a value of 1.15 means that it requires 15 per cent more wealth to achieve a given level of expected utility following strategy x than it would require under the optimal policy; in other words, an investor who is following strategy x is effectively throwing away 1 À 1 1X15 13.04 per cent of his wealth.
To evaluate expression (6) for different investment strategies, x, it is necessary to specify the Sharpe ratio, S, and the standard deviation of the risky asset return, ó , as well as the investment horizon, T , and the coef®cient of relative risk aversion, RRA. MacKinlay (1995) reports (annual) Sharpe ratios of 0.27 for the CRSP value weighted (VW) index for the period July 1963 to December 1991, and of 0.32 for the S&P500 index for the period January 1981 to June 1992. We therefore choose a value of 0.30 for the (annual) Sharpe ratio. Campbell et al. (1997) report an annualized standard deviation for the return on the VW market index for the period 1962±1994 of 15.0 per cent, and this is the value we use. Table 1 reports the values of r(x) when S 0X3, ó 0X15 and T 20 years for different values of the coef®cient of relative risk aversion, RRA, and different values of x. For the parameters chosen, the ®rst line of the table shows that the optimal leverage ratio is unity for RRA 2, while r(0X5) 1X12. That is, a portfolio strategy that holds 50 per cent of its investment in stocks when it is optimal to hold 100 per cent, requires only 12 per cent more wealth to achieve the level of expected utility yielded by the optimal strategy. Similarly for RRA 3, the optimal leverage ratio is 0X67; r(0X3) 1X09, and r(1X0) 1X08 so the cost of deviating 50 per cent up or down from the optimal allocation for 20 years is less than 10 per cent of initial wealth. As risk aversion increases, the cost of holding half the optimal allocation in stocks decreases. 17 In general, the costs of taking too small a position in stocks are surprisingly small, 18 and the cost of deviations from the optimum are approximately symmetric for positive and negative deviations. The table shows that, in general, the cost of investing too little in stocks is likely to be modest, while the cost of investing more than is optimal may be signi®cant for the more riskaverse investors since, for them, an allocation of 100 per cent to stocks may represent several times the optimal allocation. The important ®nding is that the cost of excessive conservatism, about which concern has been expressed, seems small. As shown in Table 2 , the costs of suboptimal behaviour are reduced by about 50 per cent when the horizon is reduced from 20 years to 10 years. For example, for an investor with RRA 2, the cost of investing only 50 per cent of his wealth in stocks when it is optimal to invest 100 per cent falls from 12 per cent when the horizon is 20 years to only 6 per cent when the horizon is 10 years.
Further insight into the costs of suboptimal policies can be obtained by considering the indifference curves in (ì p , ó p ) space of an investor with a given value of ã, where ì p and ó p represent the mean and standard deviation of the return on his portfolio. Rewriting equation (4) in terms of ì p (x) and ó p (x) gives Note: The table gives values of r(x), the wealth level required with equity allocation x, to reach the level of expected utility achievable with a $1 initial investment under the optimal equity allocation, x Ã , for different levels of relative risk aversion, RRA. The table assumes that the annual Sharpe ratio is 0X30, the annual standard deviation of the return on the equity portfolio, ó 0X15, and that the investor's time horizon (T ) is 20 years. The italicized cells correspond to values of x that are closest to 50 per cent of x Ã . Table 2 : Analytic Estimates of the Welfare Costs of Non-optimal Equity Allocation for a 10-year Horizon 
The table gives values of r(x), the wealth level required with equity allocation x, to reach the level of expected utility achievable with a $1 initial investment under the optimal equity allocation, x Ã , for different levels of relative risk aversion, RRA. The table assumes that the annual Sharpe ratio is 0X30, the annual standard deviation of the return on the equity portfolio, ó 0X15, and that the investor's time horizon (T ) is 10 years. The italicized cells correspond to values of x that are closest to 50% of x Ã .
Setting the left-hand side of (7) equal to a constant and simplifying, the investor's indifference curves in (ì p , ó p ) space are de®ned by
Figure 1 plots the indifference curves of an investor for whom RRA 3 along with the`capital market line' which is drawn on the assumption that the riskless interest rate is 3 per cent and the (annual) Sharpe ratio is 0.30, implying a market risk premium of 4.5 per cent if the standard deviation of the market return is 15 per cent. The capital market line is the locus of (ì p , ó p ) combinations that are attainable by varying x, the portfolio allocation to equities. It may be seen from the ®gure (as well as from Tables 1 and 2 ) that the optimal portfolio for this investor has a standard deviation of 10 per cent and a mean return of 6 per cent. The certainty equivalent (CE) rate of return for the optimal portfolio is represented by the intersection of the indifference curve through the optimal portfolio with the vertical axis; for this investor, the CE rate of return for the optimal portfolio is 4.5 per cent. Notice, however, that the capital market line is virtually coincident with the indifference curve for standard deviations ranging from about 8 per cent to about 12 per cent. Thus, while the investor's optimal portfolio has a standard deviation of 10 per cent, he is virtually indifferent between the optimal portfolio and other portfolios along the capital market line that are attainable by varying the portfolio allocation parameter x, and therefore the portfolio standard deviation, by 20 per cent around the optimum. Even larger departures from optimality have relatively small welfare implications; for example, a portfolio allocation to equities that is only 40 per cent of the optimal allocation (ó 0X04) implies a CE rate of return of 4 per cent, or only 1 2 per cent less than that of the optimal allocation. As the ®gure makes clear, it is the curvature or second derivative of the indifference curve
that determines the welfare loss associated with departures from the optimal point on the capital market line, and, for moderate degrees of risk aversion, 19 the curvature is low. Our general conclusion that the cost associated with a given proportional departure from the optimal allocation to equities is likely to be modest is reinforced by two further considerations. First, the value for the Sharpe ratio that we have assumed is based on historical data for the USA and, as Brown et al. (1995) have argued, this historical estimate may be subject to substantial positive selection bias. To the extent that the true Sharpe ratio is lower than 0X3, the welfare loss due to investing a given proportion of the optimal amount in equities will be less than we have calculated. For example, when RRA 3, if the true Sharpe ratio is only 0X15 rather than 0X30, the optimal allocation to equities drops to 0X33 from 0X67, and the cost of investing half the optimal amount in equities (x 0X165 instead of 0X33) drops to 2 per cent from 8 per cent, when the horizon is 20 years. A second, and related, consideration is that we have treated the market risk premium as known, whereas it is at best an estimate and, as Brennan (1998) has shown, estimation risk signi®cantly reduces the optimal allocation to equities for investors who are more risk averse than the logarithmic utility function (RRA 1).
Simulation Results
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 rest on the assumption that the stochastic process for stock returns is adequately described by the geometric Brownian Motion, equation (1), and that the portfolio is rebalanced continuously to maintain the equity proportion, x. To test the robustness of the results to the relaxation of these assumptions, the expected utility of non-optimal portfolio policies was calculated from actual returns, selected by Monte Carlo simulation. The basic data are the monthly excess returns (in excess of the 30-day Treasury Bill rate) on the CRSP VW market index for the period January 1926 to December 1997. The mean (annualized) excess return was 8.22 per cent, and the (annualized) standard deviation of the excess return was 19.1 per cent, yielding an annual Sharpe ratio of 0X432. This Sharpe ratio and standard deviation were then used to calculate the optimal equity allocation according to equation (5) for each value of RRA as shown in the third line of Table 3 . Then, for each value of the equity portfolio allocation, x, shown in the lefthand column of Table 3 , the expected utility was estimated by simulating portfolio returns for 10 and 20 years. For each simulation, the riskless interest rate was taken as 3 per cent and equity returns were obtained by drawing at random (with replacement) from the 864 element vector of market excess returns and adding the result to the riskless interest rate. Two portfolio strategies were evaluated for each value of x. The ®rst one assumes that the portfolio is rebalanced monthly to the assumed equity proportion. The second strategy assumes that the initial equity allocation is set equal to x, but that no rebalancing takes place; this`buy-and-hold' strategy is intended to represent the type of inef®ciency in portfolio allocations induced by the status quo bias described by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) . The simulations were repeated 100 000 times for each horizon and value of RRA, and the values of r(x) for the two strategies are reported in Table 3 . In this table, the upper entry Table 3 : Monte Carlo Estimates of the Welfare Costs of Non-optimal Equity Allocations for 10-and 20-year Horizons with and without Rebalancing RRA 2 RRA 2 RRA 3 RRA 3 RRA 4 RRA 4 RRA 5 RRA 5 RRA 6 RRA 6 RRA 7 RRA 7 T 10 T 20 Note: The table gives estimates of the values of r(x), the wealth level required with equity allocation x, to reach the level of expected utility achievable with a $1 initial investment under the optimal equity allocation, x Ã , for different levels of relative risk aversion, RRA, and time horizon, T . Each row of the table contains two entries for r(x). The upper entry assumes that the portfolio is rebalanced monthly to maintain the proportionate equity allocation x. The lower entry assumes that a fraction x of the initial investment is allocated to equities, and that there is no subsequent rebalancing. The table is constructed by Monte Carlo simulation. The riskless interest rate is assumed to be 3 per cent and the excess return on the equity portfolio is calculated by drawing uniformily with replacement from the excess returns (over the 1-month Treasury bill rate) of the CRSP VW market portfolio for the period January 1926 to December 1997. The italicized cells correspond to values of x that are closest to 50 per cent of x Ã .
in each cell corresponds to the rebalancing strategy, while the lower entry corresponds to the buy-and-hold strategy, and the italicized cells correspond to values of x that are approximately 50 per cent of the optimal values. In comparing the results reported in Table 3 with those reported in Tables  1 and 2 , allowance must be made for the fact that Table 3 is constructed using the empirical Sharpe ratio of 0X432 for the period 1926±1997 to compute x Ã , instead of the value of 0X30 used in the previous tables; in addition, the standard deviation of the market index return is 19.1 per cent instead of 15 per cent as assumed previously. To determine whether the differences between the tables are due to differences in the parameter values or to the relaxation of the lognormal assumption, Table 4 reports analytical estimates of r(x) for a rebalancing strategy, using the same values of the Sharpe ratio and standard deviation of the equity return as underlie the data used in the simulations in Table 3 . The values for the rebalancing strategy in the two tables are almost identical, con®rming the validity of the analytical expression (6) for r(x) when the portfolio is rebalanced monthly. Therefore, the differences between the values reported in Table 3 and those in Tables 1 and 2 are due almost entirely to the different values of the Sharpe ratio and the standard deviation of the equity return. The higher Sharpe ratio underlying Table 3 implies that the opportunity costs of investing less than the optimal amount in equities are higher than reported in Tables 1 and 2 . For example, in Table 1 when RRA 2, the optimal allocation to equities is 1X00, and the opportunity cost of taking half the optimal position is 12 per cent. In Table 3 when the horizon is 20 years, and RRA 2, the optimal allocation to equities is 1X13 and the opportunity cost of allocating only 0X56 to equities is about 26 per cent. When RRA 4, the opportunity cost of half the optimal allocation to equities is about 6 per cent; the corresponding ®gure for 20 years is about 11 per cent. With the exception of RRA 2 where the ®gure is higher, the opportunity cost of investing only half the optimal amount in equities for 20 years as reported in Table 3 is around 10±15 per cent of the initial investment.
Finally, we observe from the simulated results in Table 3 that the inef®ciency costs for the buy-and-hold strategy are generally smaller than, but close to, those for the rebalancing strategy. 20 We have ignored transaction costs. Taking these into account would tip the balance further in favour of the buy-and-hold strategy for non-taxable accounts. Hence, there is no evidence that the status quo bias imposes any signi®cant costs on investors.
In summary, the cost of excessive conservatism as measured by the opportunity cost of investing half the optimal amount in equities for 20 years is of the order of 5±12 per cent of the initial investment using the ®gures in Table 1 , and around 10±15 per cent of the initial investment using the data in Table 3 . Table 3 RRA 2 RRA 2 RRA 3 RRA 3 RRA 4 RRA 4 RRA 5 RRA 5 RRA 6 RRA 6 RRA 7 RRA 7 T 10 T 20 Note: The table gives estimates of the values of r(x), the wealth level required with equity allocation x, to reach the level of expected utility achievable with a $1 initial investment under the optimal equity allocation, x Ã , for different levels of relative risk aversion, RRA, and time horizon, T. The riskless interest rate is assumed to be 3 per cent, the annual Sharpe ratio is 0.432, and the annual standard deviation of the return on the equity portfolio is 0.19. These values correspond to the CRSP VW market portfolio for the period January 1926 to December 1997, whose returns are used to construct the Monte Carlo estimates in Table 3 . The italicized cells correspond to values of x that are closest to 50 per cent of x Ã .
Management Fees
To place the costs of suboptimal investment strategies in perspective, it is useful to compare them with reasonable levels of management fees. Consider a management fee which is levied each year at the rate c on the market value of the portfolio assets at the beginning of the year. Then, following Ross (1978) , it may be shown that the present value of the fees to be levied over the next T years on a portfolio with initial value S 0 , is
This expression may be understood by noting that the fraction of the portfolio taken by the ®rst year fee is c, leaving a fraction (1 À c) of the original portfolio to the investor; on this fraction a further fractional fee of c is levied in the second year; thus the fraction of the value of the initial portfolio allocated to the second year fee is c(1 À c), and the fraction of the portfolio not allocated to either the ®rst or second year fees is
so that the present value of the fees to be paid over the ®rst two years is
If the fee is charged continuously at the rate c on the current market value of the portfolio, the corresponding expression for the present value of the fees is
It follows that ð(c, T ), the amount that must be invested in a portfolio with a continuous fee rate c, to achieve the same ®nal wealth after T years as $1 invested in a portfolio without fees is given by
Values of ð(c, T ) are shown in Table 5 for annual fee rates ranging from Note: The table gives values of ð(c, T ), the wealth level required with a continuous management fee at the rate c to achieve the same payoff as $1 invested in a portfolio on which no management fee is levied when the investment horizon is T years.
that the cost of this fee is 35 per cent for a 20-year horizon and 16.2 per cent for a 10-year horizon. These costs are roughly comparable to those shown in Table 3 for RRA 2 when the allocation to equities is 0X5, or less than 50 per cent of the optimal allocation of 1X13. For higher values of RRA, the costs of the 1 1 2 per cent management fee considerably exceed the opportunity costs associated with investing only 50 per cent of the optimal amount in equities. They are comparable to the opportunity costs of investing double the optimal amount in equities.
In summary, it appears that the opportunity costs of an error of a factor of 2 in the allocation to equities is comparable to having a portfolio management fee of 1 1 2 per cent per year. Since such fee levels are commonplace, we conclude that the problem of portfolio management fees is at least as important as (and probably more important than) the purported problem of excessive conservatism in individual investor portfolio choice. Moreover, there is no evidence that the tendency of investors to allow their asset allocations to be determined passively by the realized returns on the different asset classes by their failure to rebalance, imposes any signi®cant welfare cost.
Welfare Costs of Suboptimal Diversi®cation
To assess the costs of holding an inadequately diversi®ed portfolio, Monte Carlo simulation was used to choose a starting year, and the securities to be held, in an equally weighted (EW) portfolio over a given holding period; the security returns were then drawn from the CRSP ®le. For example, for the EW portfolio with a T -year holding period, for each simulation run, i, a portfolio formation year between 1926 and 1997 À T was chosen with equal probability; then N securities were chosen at random from those listed in January of that year, where each security that was listed had an equal probability of being chosen; returns on these securities were weighted equally to form monthly portfolio returns over the next T years, 22 and the cumulative return per $1 initially invested, W TNi , was calculated. This process of selecting a year and then the securities to be included in the portfolio for the next T years was repeated 10 000 times to yield an estimate of the probability distribution of wealth outcomes from a T year, N security equally weighted (EW) portfolio strategy. The certainty equivalent (CE) wealth outcome of this strategy for an investor with a risk-aversion parameter, ã, CE(T , N ; ã) was then estimated by CE(T , N ; ã) 1 10 000 10 000
22 Where a security return was missing it was replaced by the return on another randomly chosen security for the same month.
The procedure was repeated for a value-weighted (VW) probability portfolio; whereas for the EW portfolio each security listed in January of the portfolio formation year has an equal chance of being included in the portfolio, for the VW probability portfolio, the probability of being included in the portfolio is proportional to the equity market value in January of the portfolio formation year; however, both strategies weight equally the returns on the securities that are included in the portfolio, and correspond to strategies in which the portfolio weights are rebalanced monthly to be equal.
The CE wealth is the sure amount to be received at the investment horizon per dollar invested that would make the investor as well off as following the speci®ed policy. The CE wealth outcomes are shown in Table 6 for different investment horizons (T ), numbers of securities in the portfolio (N ) and coef®-cients of relative risk aversion (RRA) for both the EW portfolio (which is shown in Roman) and the VW probability portfolio (which is shown in italic). The two rows at the foot of the table show the CE wealths for strategies of investing in the EW CRSP and the VW CRSP portfolios where the starting date is chosen randomly from the Januaries between 1926 and 1997 À T . Each column in Table 6 shows the effect of increasing the number of securities held in the portfolio, holding constant the investment horizon (T ) and risk aversion (RRA). As expected, the CE wealth from investing in a risky portfolio is greater, the less risk averse is the investor, the longer the investment horizon, and the more diversi®ed is the investment portfolio. It is immediately apparent that the welfare costs of inadequate diversi®cation can be very large indeed, and that they potentially dwarf the costs of suboptimal leverage. For example, for an investor with a RRA coef®cient of 2, the CE wealth from investing in a 1-security portfolio for 10 years is $0X36. This is equivalent to losing 64 per cent of one's wealth for sure over 10 years! For more risk-averse investors, the situation is even worse: for a RRA coef®cient of 7, the 1-security policy is equivalent to a CE loss of as much as 99 per cent over 10 years. A 5-security portfolio policy does lead to a CE wealth increase in all cases, but there are still signi®cant welfare gains from going from an EW 20-security portfolio to a 50-security portfolio; these are in the range of 7±25 per cent of the CE wealth of the 20-security strategy. To place the CE wealth gains in perspective, note that the $16X15 20-year CE for an investor with RRA 2 who purchases a 50-security portfolio corresponds to a certain annual rate of return of 14.9 per cent over 20 years; the corresponding CE rate of return for an investor with RRA 7 is 12.5 per cent. These CE rates of return fall to 14.1 per cent and 10.1 per cent when the number of securities is reduced from 50 to 10. This means that the less risk-averse investor could afford to pay an annual`management' fee of 0.8 per cent to achieve the additional diversi®cation, while the more risk-averse investor could afford to pay as much as 2.4 per cent.
The CE wealth yielded by the EW portfolio (in italic) exceeds the certainty equivalent wealth of the corresponding VW portfolio (in Roman) whenever the number of securities in the portfolio exceeds one; this re¯ects Note: The table gives Monte Carlo estimates of the certainty equivalent wealth per dollar invested for an investor with a given level of relative risk aversion, RRA, who invests in an N security portfolio for T years. The estimates in roman type are for equal probability portfolios that are derived by choosing an initial portfolio formation year at random between 1926 and 1997 À T, and choosing N securities at random from those listed on the CRSP ®le at the beginning of that year. The ®nal wealth is calculated by compounding the monthly returns on an equally weighted portfolio of the selected securities over the following T years. 10 000 simulations were used. The estimates in italics correspond to the returns on equally weighted portfolios whose constituent securities are selected with a probability that is proportional to the value of the issuing ®rm's equity in January of the randomly chosen formation year (valueweighted probability portfolios).
the higher average returns on small stocks that play a proportionately more important role in the EW portfolios. It is a striking fact that, while the 1-security portfolios yield very low CEs, the 5-security EW portfolios have CEs that exceed those of the VW CRSP portfolios for all values of RRA less than 5 for the 10-year strategy and for all values of RRA for the 20-year strategy. That is, on the basis of the historical evidence, it is a superior strategy for an investor to invest in an EW monthly rebalanced portfolio of 5 stocks for 20 years than to invest in the VW CRSP index portfolio for the same period; the 20-security EW portfolios outperform the VW CRSP index portfolio for all values of RRA considered. Indeed the 50-security EW portfolios have CE that exceed those of the EW CRSP index portfolio. This is because the average geometric return for the randomly selected portfolios exceeds that of the EW CRSP index portfolio by about 1 per cent per annum. The main difference in average portfolio composition between the randomly selected portfolios and the EW CRSP index portfolio is that the securities included in the former are all listed at the beginning of the 10-or 20-year holding period, whereas the constituents of the CRSP portfolio are continually updated to re¯ect new listings. Therefore, the superior performance of the randomly selected portfolios is consistent with the abnormally low returns to new listings that have been documented by Loughran and Ritter (1995) .
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The CE wealths of the VW portfolios (in italics) typically ± i.e. except for the 1-security portfolios ± fall between those of the EW and VW CRSP indices and are around 60 per cent of those of the corresponding EW portfolios. This is not too surprising since these portfolios, while composed of securities selected on the basis of their market capitalization, are actually equally weighted ± their formation scheme is thus a hybrid of equal and value weighting.
The essential message of Table 6 is that there are signi®cant diversi®cation gains to be garnered by increasing the number of securities in the portfolio and that these gains, which are more pronounced for higher levels of risk aversion, are still increasing when the number of securities in the portfolio is as high as 20. Table 7 repeats the analysis of Table 6 but for buy and hold strategies instead of monthly rebalancing strategies. For both the VW and the EW portfolios, the buy and hold CEs are always less than the corresponding monthly rebalancing strategy CEs shown in Table 6 . Monthly portfolio rebalancing ± which entails selling winners and buying losers ± seems to pay, at least on a pre-transaction cost basis. This is in interesting contrast to our ®nding that for the asset allocation decision the buy and hold strategy performs just about as well as the monthly revision strategy as shown in Table 3 . It is Note: The table gives Monte Carlo estimates of the certainty equivalent wealth per dollar invested for an investor with a given level of relative risk aversion, RRA, who invests in an N security portfolio for T years. The estimates in roman type are for equal probability portfolios that are derived by choosing an initial portfolio formation year at random between 1926 and 1997 À T, and choosing N securities at random from those listed on the CRSP ®le at the beginning of that year. The ®nal wealth is calculated for an initially equally weighted portfolio of the selected securities when a buy and hold strategy is followed over the following T years. 10 000 simulations were used. The estimates in italics correspond to the returns on equally weighted portfolios whose constituent securities are selected with a probability that is proportional to the value of the issuing ®rm's equity in January of the randomly chosen formation year (value-weighted probability portfolios).
possible that the superior returns of the monthly revision strategy are due, at least in part to biases caused by the bid±ask spread (Roll, 1983; Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; Conrad and Kaul, 1993) . Since the buy and hold strategy is easier to implement than the monthly rebalancing strategy and is free of bias, we tend to place more weight on the results shown in Table 7 . These show the same qualitative tendencies as Table 6 . For example, for an investor with a 20-year horizon and RRA equal to 2 the CE of a 5-security EW portfolio strategy is 6X92 which is equivalent to an annual rate of return of 10.1 per cent; as the number of securities is increased to 50 the CE rises to 9X68 which is equivalent to an annual rate of return of 12.0 per cent. For more risk-averse investors, the CE gains are even larger. Thus, we conclude that the potential welfare costs of inadequate diversi®cation may be high. Equally striking, however, is the relatively poor performance of the VW market index. This re¯ects the superior returns on small ®rms over our sample period.
Conclusion
In this article, we have used the expected utility paradigm to show that the welfare costs of suboptimal leverage decisions made by individual investors are likely to be relatively modest, particularly when they are compared to the typical levels of fees charged for the management of investment portfolios. On the other hand, we have also shown that the costs associated with inadequate levels of diversi®cation are potentially very large, and that signi®cant welfare gains accrue to increasing the number of securities in the portfolio. This suggests that public policy should be directed at ensuring that individuals who manage their own retirement portfolios hold suf®ciently diversi®ed portfolios, and that the management costs of these portfolios be not too high. There is much less cause to be concerned that individuals will choose portfolios that are insuf®ciently leveraged.
